Chapter 5 Institutions (Week 5)

5.1 Discussion questions

  • Can international institutions help prevent or punish acts of aggression? Do you agree with Mearsheimer (1994)/Keohane&Martin (1995)? Why?

  • Should outsiders intervene militarily to stop humanitarian crises?

  • Why do some individuals or groups use violence against their own governments or unarmed civilians? (*)

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5.2 Causal logic of offensive realism

Mearsheimer begins with five assumptions.

  • Anarchy
  • States are capable of using force
  • No state can be certain that another will not use force against it
  • States want to survive and maintain sovereignty
  • States are rational

He then claims that based on these five assumptions, states will

  • fear each other
  • states rely on self-help
  • states seek to maximize their relative power

5.3 Relative gains vs. absolute gains

Mearsheimer focuses on his critique of liberal institutionalism on its neglect of relative gains. His main point appears to be that when states seriously care about relative gains, institutions cannot facilitate cooperation. But why is that the case? In p.21, Mearsheimer qualifies his argument a bit

  • “I am not suggesting that relative-gains considerations make cooperation impossible; my point is simply that they can pose a serious impediment to cooperation and must therefore be taken into account when developing a theory of cooperation among states.”

Interestingly, Mearsheimer turns to Powell and Snider, and argue

“Powell and Snidal offer different arguments about when relative-gains considerations are slight. Nevertheless, both are essentially realist arguments. Neither study discusses how institutions might facilitate cooperation, and both explanations are built around familiar realist concepts.” (p.22)

It should be noted that Snider talks about the limited significance of relative gains rationale (particularly when there are more than two actors involved). In terms of the late Bob Powell’s argument, let me borrow his words. In this 1991 article, Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory, Powell argues that whether states maximize relative or absolute gains are empirically meaningless because they are just theoretical construct (after all, states as rational unitary actors do not exist). One main takeaway from the article is that the divide can be synthesized (read: ignored) since it ultimately depends on the risk of the out-side option (i.e. the risk of using force).

Two additional points from Powell’s paper. First, the changing costs of war do not change the international system. Yet they drive the potential of cooperation. Hence, structural realism cannot account for states’ cooperation. Second, there are two factors that affect cooperation: anarchy and systematic constraints. In the formal analysis, the second factor relates to a simple assumption that economically stronger states are more likely to win a war. Note that throughout the formal treatment, states only care about absolute gains. But the concerns about relative gains can kick in via this assumption.